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JUSTICE AND THE BUREAUCRATIZATION
OF APPELLATE COURTS
Joseph Vining*
The author notes the growing bureaucratization of appellate
justice in the United States and, in particular, the drafting of
opinions by law clerks rather than by judges. Taking the
Supreme Court of the United States as an example, and
comparing its internal procedure with that of large
administrative agencies, he questions whether the method of
analysis familiarly used by lawyers to arrive at an authoritative
statement of law is applicable to legal texts bureaucratically
produced. He suggests that legal method and its presuppositions
are ultimately associated with the authority of law, and
concludes that there may be critical losses not now being weighed
in discussions of institutional structure and practice.
La justice et la bureaucratisation des
tribunaux d'appel
L 'auteur souligne l'accroissement de la bureaucratisation de la
justice en appel aux Etats Unis et, en particulier, la redaction
d'opinions par des clercs plut6t que par des juges (eux-memes).
Prenant comme exemple la Cour Supreme des Etats Unis, et
comparant sa procddure interne avec celle de grandes
organisations administratives, il demande si la methode
d'analyse normallement utilis~e par les avocats pour arriver d
une affirmation autoritaire sur un point de droit peut appliquer
aux decisions produites bureaucratiquement. Il suggLre que la
methodologie l6gale et ses presuppositions sont (associ~es) en
dernier lieu avec l'autoritd de la loi, et conclut qu'il se peut qu'il
y ait des pertes critiques qui ne sont pas presentement 6valuLes
dans les discussions des structure etpratiques institutionnelles.
In the real world justice denied is not justice. Talking from
the beginning about access to justice, rather than simply justice,
emphasizes in a salutary way this commonplace of citizen and
client. Justice that is inaccessible, delayed, refused does not just
sit there glowing like a grail, which those separated from it may
contemplate and yearn for. It is only in imagining that justice is
available to someone, and in imagining what it would be like to
be that someone, that one can see the thing as justice at all. To
* Professor of Law, University of Michigan.
This paper was originally presented as the Inaugural Lecture in the
Distinguished Scholars Program on Access to Justice at the University of
Windsor, March 26, 1981. I profited from my discussions at Windsor, and
am obliged to the Faculty of Law for their gracious invitation to speak.
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put it in economic terms, justice is not a commodity, the
production of which can be analyzed apart from its
distribution. Who gets justice very much determines what it is
they are getting, whether, that is, it is justice.
But this said, it is also true that there must be something
going on inside the legal system that makes worthwhile all the
efforts to gain access to it. Justice may not be justice if
someone does not have it, but someone can have all there is to
have and still not have justice. There can be full access, and still
no justice. Arrangements can be made so that everyone can
crowd around the table, but there must be something more than
cold and empty plates there. What one has access to is surely as
important as the access, and it is this, the what, that I wish to
talk about in this lecture.
I shall be making a simple point: there are presuppositions
to legal method which we all, lawyers included, are ignoring at
our peril. Ignoring these presuppositions can end in failure to
serve up anything to which anyone will give willing obedience,
which will be treated as truly authoritative. Legal institutions
are simply not effective, not efficient (again to use an economic
term), unless they manage at the least to create legitimacy. They
must at the least act as a source of the authoritative in secular
society, and if this-the authoritative-is missing, I doubt very
much that what there is access to can be called justice.
We spoke of presuppositions. There is a connection between
legal method and the internal structure of legal institutions. I
will use as my example legal institutions in the United States.
That, as one might imagine, will immediately lead me to the
Supreme Court of the United States. But I think what I have to
say is applicable to courts beyond the Supreme Court and on
both sides of the border, for I wish to talk about practical
things, structure and practice, and their relation to theoretical
things, the presuppositions of legal method in our countries and
culture. My thesis is that form must follow function really
much more in law than in architecture. Institutional design and
institutional practice in law must seek to realize, to approach in
reality, the presuppositions of legal method if there is to be
efficiency in any sense of the word. Legal method, I want to
suggest, does not adapt to institutions. If there is no fit between
the two, what we lose is law, not just an old way of doing things
that we can leave behind.I
Let us turn then to method.
The method of choice in standard legal analysis is close
reading and full discussion of a text. That is what lawyers
distinctively do. In the United States the texts of choice are the
'There may be a presumption that man's mind adapts to change in his
external circumstances and that change in external circumstance leads to,
causes in some way, change in mind. But this is at best only a presumption.
If it be thought a generalization, the experience of legal authority is not
evidence for it.
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opinions of the federal Supreme Court. Most American lawyers
gravitate towards them, with important and untraced effects
upon the substance of American law. The prominence of
constitutional law, for example, in the curricula of American
law schools, in the strategies of our litigating lawyers, and in
the thinking of American judges, may be quite as much a
product of its methodological congeniality as of its substantive
importance.
Supreme Court texts have a special and obvious attraction
for lawyers. The forms of speech adopted in either writing or
analyzing Supreme Court opinions refer to a single mind, that
of "this Court." A single mind lying behind other legal texts is
never quite so easy to postulate. There is also an elision of time.
Time is very nearly transcended. The Court of men long dead is
still "this Court." If one listens to the way a lawyer talks, what
John Marshall said in 18032 is as important and relevant as
what any contemporary justice says. And the texts produced by
the Supreme Court are conventionally authoritative throughout
the geographical jurisdiction of the United States.
Geographical reach is not necessary to a text's relevance to the
task of determining what the law is on this or that queston; but
the breadth of the Supreme Court's jurisdiction at least helps
eliminate the lawyer's everpresent worry that what he is so
carefully parsing and arguing from may be an aberration and
of little moment, no real evidence of anything larger and more
meaningful. Working with other opinions, of state supreme
courts, or federal appeals courts or district judges, or Canadian
or British courts, an American lawyer is always open to the
response "So what? That's their opinion, but why do you pay
such attention to it?" Indeed, lawyers feel obliged to respond to
2 E.g., Marbury v. Madison (1803), 1 Cranch (5 U.S.) 137. In fact, what Mr.
Justice Marshall said is subtly changed when its authority is invoked - in
situations, that is, in which it is examined by lawyers rather than by
antiquarians or historians. Its punctuation may be changed, its
capitalization and spelling are changed, its rather liberal use of italics may
be toned down, and it is reprinted without the fuffy S's characteristic of late
eighteenth and early nineteenth century orthography and printing. See, e.g.,
William B. Lockhart, Yale Kamisar, and Jesse H. Choper, Constitutional
Rights and Liberties: Cases and Materials, 5th ed. (St. Paul: West
Publishing, 1981), 1. Reading Marbury v. Madison in the original leaves
quite a different impression. It seems antique, a voice from long ago. Asked
why the opinion is not printed today as it originally appeared, a
constitutional law scholar will reply that small liberties are taken with the
text so that the impression upon the modern ear, the impressionable
student, of what Mr. Justice Marshall says for the Court (and the present
tense is often used) will be the same as the impression made upon the
contemporary ear in 1803. This is a small example of elision of time. See, in
this connection, the sensitive discussion of translating an authoritative text
into contemporary idiom in "Introduction to the New Testament," The
New English Bible (Oxford and Cambridge: The University Presses, 1970),
v-vii.
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the question "Why pay attention?" even if unasked, whenever
they set about legal analysis using texts from a variety of
courts; and in responding, they appeal, rather more than they
would like to think, to the primitive assertion that each judge
speaks as an oracle of the law. It is possible for lawyers to think
themselves less exposed to a charge of primitivism if they work
with statements of the Supreme Court.
But legal habits in the United States are threatened today.
There is a sense among serious analysts that the Supreme Court
is failing them and that the texts of choice for American legal
analysis are wanting. Extraordinary open complaints are
underscored by a general tone of comment and criticism which
is unhappy and disrespectful. There is not contempt so much as
there is distress of the kind associated with deprivation. If one
listens one can hear a general murmur of dissatisfaction,
punctuated by sharp cries.3
Complaint about imperfection, of course, is perennial, as is
some undercurrent of disrespect. Criticism of the Warren
Court was couched in terms of craftsmanship.' Lawyers from
the southern states did not respect that Court. Pre-World War
II realists were most certainly contemptuous of the then-
3 What is said privately is stronger than what is written. Some criticism is a
reflection of special concern for constitutional law, some is not; the
Supreme Court is by no means exclusively a constitutional court. For
examples of what is written, see James B. White, "A Response to 'The
Rhetoric of Powell's Bakke' " (1981), 38 Washington and Lee L. Rev. 73;
Note, "Plurality Decisions and Judicial Decisionmaking" (1981), 94
Harvard L. Rev. 1127, 1127-28; Wayne R. Lafave, Search and Seizure: A
Treatise on the Fourth Amendment, vol. 3 (St. Paul: West Publishing,
1978), 1981 Pocket Part, 106-15; Christina Whitman, "Constitutional
Torts" (1980), 79 Michigan L. Rev. 5, 27; Henry P. Monaghan, "Taking
Supreme Court Opinions Seriously" (1979), 39 Maryland L. Rev. 1;
Vincent A. Blasi, "Bakke as Precedent: Does Mr. Justice Powell Have a
Theory?" (1979), 67 Calif. L. Rev. 21; Philip B. Kurland, "Book Review"
(1979), 47 U. of Chicago L. Rev. 185, 197-98; David L. Shapiro, "Mr.
Justice Rehnquist: A Preliminary View" (1976), 90 Harv. L. Rev. 293; John
F. Davis and William L. Reynolds, "Judicial Cripples: Plurality Opinions
in the Supreme Court", [1974] Duke L. J. 59; John Hart Ely, "The Wages
of Crying Wolf: A Comment on Roe v. Wade" (1973), 82 Yale L. J. 920;
Alan M. Dershowitz and John Hart Ely, "Harris v. New York: Some
Anxious Observations on the Candor and Logic of the Emerging Nixon
Majority" (1971), 80 Yale L. J. 1198. See also the eloquent but guarded
comments of Paul A. Freund, Alexander M. Bickel, Peter D. Ehrenhaft,
Russell D. Niles, Bernard G. Segal, Robert L. Stern, and Charles A. Wright
in Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court (1972),
57 F.R.D. 573, 582-83, and Francis A. Allen's address at the University of
Victoria, November, 1980, "Humanistic Legal Education: The Quiet
Crisis," (1981), 25 Law Quadrangle Notes 25-31.
' See, e.g., Henry M. Hart, Jr. "The Time Chart of the Justices" (1959), 73
Harvard L. Rev. 84. Cf. Thurmond Arnold, "Professor Hart's Theology"
(1960), 73 Harvard L. Rev. 1298. See also Herbert Wechsler, "Toward
Neutral Principles of Constitutional Law" (1959), 73 Harv. L. Rev. 1.
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traditional legal forms. The late nineteenth century was spent
fighting the foolishness of those legal fictions that are the
subject of Dicey's most entertaining pages. But the restlessness
today is different. It is accompanied by and points to a change
of a sort not experienced before.
There is more to the complaint than that the Court's opinions
too often treat other legal texts in a perfunctory way, do not
engage points made in dissent, are inconsistent or poorly
articulated-as if the writer of the opinion were sleepy, or
hurried, or dull. Opinions now more often seem things written
by no one at all. They are long, rather too long to be written by
men struggling with a vast increase in caseload.5 They are too
much things of patchwork, things" which seem, on their face, to
express more the institutional process of their making than the
thinking, feeling, and reasoning of the author and those
persuaded with him. Poor craftsmanship, if that were the
problem, can be cured by gradually replacing the authors of
opinions with better craftsmen. The writing of opinions by no
one, bureaucratic writing, is not so easy to change once it has
taken hold. It is a structural matter, a consequence of and
indeed embedded in the roles into which and out of which
individuals move over time. There may be a quality of
irreversibility about it, which we should fear as much as we fear
the irreversibility of environmental change or genetic
manipulation.
The real possibility of the bureaucratization of the Supreme
Court is raised not merely by a reading of what is written in the
name of the Court. Bureaucratization is reflected in the
elaboration of the Court's institutional organization,
particularly its hierarchical aspect. Condition, consequence, or
cause of the change which is of real concern, the Court seems to
be becoming far more complicated. Certainly it is no longer
nine judges in dialogue with one another, trying to come to
common ground and setting out in writing their agreements and
disagreements with a special sense of the representative quality
of their thinking. Each of the nine is acquiring a staff,
developed from the legal secretary or research assistant of old.
As the staff has grown there are indications that it is becoming
layered. Chief clerks, senior clerks, and junior clerks are
beginning to appear. Clerks may interview the flood of
applicants for clerkships. One clerk may help to regulate access
by other clerks to the justice himself. As the staff grows and
becomes layered, there is inevitably a premium upon tenure in
See, e.g., Paul A. Freund, Alexander M. Bickel, Peter D. Ehrenhaft,
Russell D. Niles, Bernard G. Segal, Robert L. Stern, and Charles A.
Wright, Report of the Study Group on the Caseload of the Supreme Court
(1972), 57 F.R.D. 573; Gerhard Casper and Richard A. Posner, The
Workload of the Supreme Court (Chicago: American Bar Foundation,
1976); Brown Transport Corp. v. Atcon, Inc. (1978), 439 U.S. 1014.
Vol. 2
Windsor Yearbook ofA ccess to Justice
office: choosing replacements becomes ever more time-
consuming, and specialized roles take time to learn.
Within a single generation the justices have quadrupled the
number of their law clerks. Some justices are now asking their
clerks to stay a longer time. The short stint by the bright,
young, just-graduated law student, who moved into an intimate
relationship with an old justice, kept him fresh, and then
moved almost immediately on into his own life and career, has
already begun to be replaced by a job description and a job. It
appears that the nine staffs communicate directly with one
another. They may be horizontally connected and reach
agreements among themselves. Or they may operate more by
bargain than persuasion: the fact that they do not act for
themselves means that they are not in a role to which
persuasion is immediately pertinent. And there may be
reciprocal relationships vertically. Justices may be loyal to staff
or to the expectations that make complex hierarchical
organizations of individuals possible. 6
The actual operations of the Court have always been veiled
and still are, and what is revealed is often dismissed as gossip or
self-aggrandizement. But clerks routinely now say in private
that they were the ghostwriters of one or another important
opinion and that it was published with hardly a change, while
studies of lower court procedures suggest that an institutional
practice of assigning to staff the reading of briefs and the
6 John B. Oakley and Robert S. Thompson, Law Clerks and the Judicial
Process: Perceptions of the Qualities and Functions of Law Clerks in
American Courts (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1980) (published in
preliminary form as "Law Clerks in Judges' Eyes: Tradition and
Innovation in the Use of Legal Staff by American Judges" (1979), 67 Calif.
L. Rev. 1286) contains a pioneering description of the growth and use of
staff within appellate courts generally and at the Supreme Court, together
with an extensive bibliography of published material. See also Gerhard
Casper and Richard A. Posner, The Workload of the Supreme Court
(Chicago: American Bar Foundation, 1976), 72-73, 78-81, 108-109, 115;
Paul A. Freund, Alexander M. Bickel, Peter D. Ehrenhaft, Russell D. Niles,
Bernard G. Segal, Robert L. Stern, and Charles A. Wright, supra n. 4,
582-83. The publication of Bob Woodward and Scott Armstrong, The
Brethren: Inside the Supreme Court (New York: Simon and Schuster, 1979),
relying more on clerks' than judges' descriptions of the opinion writing
process, and using journalistic rather than scholarly techniques of
investigation, evoked a substantial secondary literature of comment and
criticism, often by former clerks, which is itself a source of information.
See, e.g., John P. Frank, "The Supreme Court: The Muckrakers Return"
(1980), 66 A m. Bar Assn. J. 161. For a review of that literature and citations
to it see Richard B. Saphire, "The Value of The Brethren: A Response to Its
Critics" (1980), 58 Texas L. Rev. 1475. A brief but widely-circulated
discussion of writing by staff at a time when the size of the staff was smaller
can be found in John P. Frank, Marble Palace (New York: Alfred A.
Knopf, 1958), 116-18. For a comparative view, see Michael J. Herman,
"Law Clerking at the Supreme Court of Canada" (1975), 13 Osgoode Hall
L. J. 279.
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drafting of opinions is becoming well established.' However
veiled the actual operations of the Supreme Court may be, we
know that a large professional staff must have something to do.
All are working to produce a product. And the products they
are producing are the texts of choice to which American
lawyers turn when they undertake legal analysis.
I suggest that as lawyers become aware of this, their
confidence that through reading an opinion or set of opinions
they can reach a mind behind those opinions must begin to fail
within them. Lawyers assume that legal writing is a means of
access to the legal mind. They assume that they are actually
able to listen in on a dialogue undertaken on behalf of us all. To
the extent the Supreme Court does become a bureaucracy, that
assumption cannot be made.
Think for a moment how differently American lawyers treat
opinions issued by one or another of the great federal
administrative agencies, the Interstate Commerce Commission
or the Federal Trade Commission, with their many employees,
many layers, and complex organization charts. There is no
such governing assumption, no such faith where opinions of
administrative agencies are concerned. When commissioners
decide a case after argument and briefing (if there is oral
argument, and if it be assumed that they rather than their staff
assistants read the briefs), they vote, and the vote is frequently,
perhaps typically, transmitted to an opinion writing section of
the agency, which is one of many offices on the agency's
organization chart. The opinion writing section prepares a
See, e.g., J. Woodford Howard, Jr., Courts of Appeals in the Federal
Judicial System: A Study of the Second, Fifth, and District of Columbia
Circuits (Princeton: Princeton U. Press, 1981), 198, 200, 208-09, 279; John
B. Oakley and Robert S. Thompson, Law Clerks and the Judicial Process:
Perceptions of the Qualities and Functions of Law Clerks in American
Courts (Berkeley: U. of California Press, 1980) (studying the Ninth Circuit,
the United States District Courts of California, the California Courts of
Appeal, and the California Supreme Court); B.E. Witkin, Manual on
Appellate Court Opinions (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1977); Wade H.
McCree, Jr., "Bureaucratic Justice: An Early Warning" (1981), 129 U. of
Penn. L. Rev. 777; Alvin B. Rubin, "Bureaucratization of the Federal
Courts: The Tension Between Justice and Efficiency" (1980), 55 Notre
Dame Lawyer 648; Robert A. Kagan, Bliss Cartwright, Laurence M.
Friedman, and Stanton Wheeler, "The Evolution of State Supreme Courts'
(1978), 76 Mich. L. Rev. 961, 971-73, 982; Robert S. Thompson, "One
Judge and No Judge Appellate Opinions" (1975), 50 Calif. State Bar J. 476;
John Lesinski and N.O. Stockmeyer, Jr., "Prehearing Research and
Screening in the Michigan Court of Appeals: One Court's Method for
Increasing Judicial Productivity" (1973), 26 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1211; Paul
R. Baier, "The Law Clerks: Profile of an Institution" (1973), 26 Vanderbilt
L. Rev. 1125; George R. Smith, "A Primer of Opinion Writing for Law
Clerks" (1973), 26 Vanderbilt L. Rev. 1203. See also Paul D. Carrington,
Daniel J. Meador, and Maurice Rosenberg, Justice On Appeal (St. Paul:
West Publishing, 1976), 44-55; Daniel J. Meador, Appellate Courts: Staff
and Process in the Crisis of Volume (St. Paul: West Publishing, 1974).
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justificatory and explanatory opinion for the result. If the vote
had gone the other way, the same office would write the
opinion. It would simply say different or opposite things. The
opinion is then sent back to the commissioners or their staffs,
who may read it, may amend it, may return it, or may approve
it. Once approved, it is promulgated on behalf of the agency.8
Would it be too harsh to say that no good lawyer would ever
spend the time on these opinions that he lavishes on Supreme
Court opinions? Certainly he would not look for nuance and
8 Bureaucratic writing of administrative opinions has been a subject of
empirical study and lively debate in the United States at least since the
enactment of the federal and state Administrative Procedure Acts. See, e.g.,
Administrative Procedure: Hearings on S. 674, S. 675, and S. 918 Before a
Subcomm. of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 77th Cong., 1st Sess.
(1941) 816 (statement of Dean Acheson); Subcomm. on Legislative
Oversight, H. Rep. No. 2711, 85th Cong., 2d Sess. (1959) 41;
Administrative Procedure Act: Hearings on S. 1663 Before the Subcomm.
on Administrative Practice and Procedure of the Senate Judiciary
Committee, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. (1964) 47-63, 282-88 (statement of Robert
M. Benjamin); Special Message of President Kennedy to Congress on the
Regulatory Agencies, April 13, 1961, Public Papers of the Presidents, John
F. Kennedy 1961 (1962), 267, 271 (based upon the Landis Report);
President's Advisory Council on Executive Organization, A New
Regulatory Framework, Report on Selected Independent Regulatory
Agencies (1971), 49-50 (the Ash Report); Louis B. Hector, "Government by
Anonymity: Who Writes Our Regulatory Opinions" (1959), 45 Am. Bar
Assn. J. 1260; Bernard Schwartz, The Professor and the Commissions (New
York: Alfred A. Knopf, 1959), 189-192; Howard Westwood, "The Davis
Treatise: Meaning to the Practitioner" (1959), 43 Minn. L. Rev. 607, 617;
Frank E. Cooper "Administrative Law, The Process of Decision" (1958),
44Am. Bar Assn. J. 237.
Descriptions of agency practice may be found in Martin Shapiro, The
Supreme Court and Administrative Agencies (New York: The Free Press,
1968), 131-133; Joseph C. Palamountain, Jr., "The Federal Trade
Commission and the Indiana Standard Case", in Edwin A. Bock, ed.,
Government Regulation of Business, A Casebook (Englewood Cliffs:
Prentice-Hall, 1965), 156; David M. Welborn, "Assigning Responsibility
for Regulatory Decisions to Individual Commissioners: The Case of the
ICC" (1966), 18 Admin. L. Rev. 13; Richard 0. Berner, Constraints on the
Regulatory Process, A Case Study of the Regulation of Cable Television
(Cambridge, Mass.: Ballinger, 1976), 61-83; William K. Jones, Licensing of
Domestic Air Transportation by the Civil Aeronautics Board, Report to the
Comm. on Licenses and Authorizations of the Administrative Conference
of the U.S. (1962), 170-74; and William L. Cary, Politics and the
Regulatory Agencies (New York: McGraw-Hill, 1967), 84-86 (Securities and
Exchange Commission).
In American administrative law the issues are litigated under the rubrics
"institutional decisionmaking" or "the one who decides must hear." See,
e.g., Daniel J. Gifford, "The Morgan Cases: A Retrospective View"
(1978), 30 Admin. L. Rev. 237; T.S.C. Motor Freight Lines, Inc. v. United
States, 186 F. Supp. 777 (S.D. Texas, 1960), aff'd sub nom. Herrin
Transportation Co. v. United States, 366 U.S. 419 (1961); Mazza v.
Cavicchia (1954), 15 N.J. 498, 105 A. 2d 545; Bernard Schwartz,
Administrative Law: A Casebook (Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 494-510.
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image, or examine the structure of thought revealed, or work
out developments and transformations over time, which is what
American lawyers do with Supreme Court opinions. He would
not think to do it, and would feel foolish if he found himself
engaged in such an intense and delicate reading-as if, fresh
from an immersion in Milton, he caught himself reading a
corporate advertisement in the same way he had been reading
Paradise Lost. The reason is not that such agency decisions are
unimportant. They are often of vast importance. The reason is
that the texts produced by such agencies are not access to a
mind behind them, and are not evidence of the workings of that
mind. The texts are evidence only of what kinds of evidence it
was thought necessary to produce for the purpose of giving the
appearance of the workings of a mind. One knows from
commissioners' votes what they did.9 But one cannot listen in
on them. One does not know whether there was dialogue that
produced a decision that could be said to be a common
decision. One does not know whether there is any mutual
influence over time. One can be sure that the commissioners
themselves would not read opinions written by an opinion
writing section several floors below to discover what their
colleagues present or past actually thought. They would look at
letters, memoranda, or notes of conversation. Those would be
their texts.
It may be acknowledged that lawyers who challenge
administrative action in court in the United States do behave as
if the opinions of the great agencies written in bureaucratic
fashion have independent significance. Actually, challenging
lawyers begin on a rather different tack, which is not taken with
judicial opinions. Initially they will try to show if they can
either some ex parte influence upon what is written or some
forbidden consultation between investigatory, prosecutory and
opinion-writing officials within the agency, and in this part of
their analysis or brief the administrative opinion will be viewed
and portrayed as if were the product of a machine, rather like
one of the credit card letters churned out by computers and
mailed to us so frequently these days. Their search is for
circuits that went awry, "inputs" that were wrong. But if
defending lawyers build a good enough wall around the process
to keep the challenger from seeing into it, or successfully
defend its design and working in the particular instance, the
challenging lawyer will shift and will indeed portray the opinion
as if it were a judicial opinion. The argument will then be about
the nature and adequacy of the reasoning set forth, connection
between basis and conclusion, consistency with prior decisions,
distinction between what was essential and what peripheral in
9 One knows what they did if it be assumed that they did more than follow
their staffs' advice. If not, then as in the case of the later Merovingian kings
(the famous roisfain~ants) there is no clear sense in which it is they who do
what is done.
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prior decisions, and interpretation of majority writings in light
of points made in dissents. Both challenger and defender will
use these and all the other techniques of textual analysis used by
lawyers to establish what the law is and to criticize and defend
particular statements of it.
Such activity on judicial review of administrative action does
presume and imply a search for a unifying mind. But it does not
mean that there is any belief in such a mind on the part of
lawyers, even what might be called a working belief or
suspension of disbelief. It does not mean that the view of the
text-as opposed to its portrayal-has shifted away from that
adopted in the first part of a standard challenge, that is, the
view of the bureaucratic opinion as the product of a machine.
Lawyers' use of these techniques of textual analysis in working
with the texts produced by a bureaucracy is behavior which is
either conventional or strategic. It is conventional, as a prelude
to argument about matters of policy that could be discussed
regardless of the existence of an opinion, conventional in the
sense that saluations in letters are conventional, particularly if
they are elaborate. It is strategic in that lawyers do it because it
might just work. A showing of breaks in the chain of reasoning
or of inconsistency without justification might lead judges,
under an illusion that they were dealing with the workings of a
mind, to reverse and remand as they would if they were
reviewing a lower court. There is no necessity for lawyers'
commitment to the convention or to the implications of the
strategic stance they take, for in challenging decisions of
administrative agencies there are many routes to follow other
than legal argument. Negotiation with the agency is always
possible, as is delay, appeal to Congressional committees,
influencing the agency's budget, and involvement in electoral
politics. Because argument from texts is but one string to the
bow, lawyers can afford to think of what they do as simply
strategic.
But if the text, the opinion, was all there was-as is almost
the case on the judicial side-could lawyers afford to be
strategic? To the extent they are strategic, they are dealing with
nothing that has authority or meaning for them. Can lawyers
do without authority? Can any of us? Suppose lawyers decided
to give the text authority. Could they pretend that the opinion is
something it is not, that this product of many hands is the
speech of a mind that can command their attention? Can
lawyers live without authority and meaning, or supply it by
pretense and presumption? Can any of us?
Let me just touch upon what we might expect to find if
Supreme Court opinions were to be perceived as only the
outcomes of a system or process, and the Court itself were to be
seen as a little bureaucratic system. Consider the common
reaction to computers and other complex machines that order
our lives. The touch-tone dialing system uses music (or at least
tones in sequence) to convey information to its vast and
1982
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complex center. We are often shown the place on television
advertisements. It is a room filled with whirring wheels and
blinking lights, and we are shown, as in a painting by Magritte,
the backs of the heads of human beings in the room, who face,
as we do, the banks of machinery. At a telephone in a dimly lit
college dormitory a student with a panpipe plays a little tune
which gains him entry to the system and a free call to a friend
three thousand miles away. The student has the key to the
system. He knows its secret. What is the common attitude
toward the student and what he has managed to do? What is
your attitude, really? Is there not an element of delight in it,
just a little desire to applaud? Does it immediately seem to you
that he is a thief?
When we do not pay our credit card bills exactly on time, a
computer begins to speak to us. Messages are printed out,
beginning with gentle reminders and then becoming darker and
more ominous as time goes on, with words like "please,"
"appreciate," and "thank you" progressively deleted, until in
the end there are sharp threats contained in a personal letter
addressed to us in a separate envelope-just before we pay.
What is the common attitude toward a fulminating computer
creditor? What is your attitude, really? Do you pay attention to
it, as you would pay attention to the command or plea of a
person? Do you warm to the politeness and concern expressed
in the early messages, or quiver at the threats and sternness
programmed into the last? Do you feel badly that the computer
had to print out a special letter to you? Or are you moved only
by the thought that at some point the computer may put a black
mark on your credit rating for tardy payment, and otherwise
look entirely to your own convenience, when it is you pay your
bills, when you can get to the bank, and the like?
In these instances and others I think you and I could summon
up-cheating on computerized tests, or taking advantage of
pricing mistakes in large supermarkets-there appears a
striking loss of the sense of obligation. And in each of them
individuals are dealing, or sense that they are dealing, with a
mindless system. It does not have authority for them. They
react to it, and are interested in what it might do to them. But
they do not internalize its purposes, or listen really to what it
says to them. Lawyers are not likely to be any different, when
they deal with what they think to be a mindless system or with a
mind, if mind there be, that is hidden, a secret mind. ' 0
10 In administrative law a judicial analogy for a challenged administrative
practice is usually enough to save the administrative practice. But as
judicial practice approximates more and more the administrative, judicial
practice can no longer serve as the touchstone of legitimacy. Whatever the
place of illusion in life or in law, cf. Thurman Arnold, supra n. 3, 1311,
lawyers seem aware of the contrast between the presuppositions brought to
the reading of judicial texts and those brought to texts bureaucratically
produced in administrative agencies, and of the difficulty of maintaining
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Now some of you may think that this is simply a worry taken
too far, the finding of a special difficulty in what is really a
general condition of things that ever has been and always will
be. It may be suggested that what I have said about the problem
for legal analysis posed by the possibility of a bureaucratized
Supreme Court applies to any written document, any piece of
legislation, to Papal Bulls, histories, even standard
philosophical works. Anyone who has had anything to do with
the publication of books will have been struck by the extent to
which books can be the product of many hands, of research
assistants, friendly critics of the manuscript, professional
readers, editors, copy-editors. One look at the facsimile' of
Ezra Pound's editorial work on The Wasteland tells us how
endemic this is: poetry itself is not exempt. The question could
be asked, then, must we not always jump over how a work is
produced and treat it as an integrated whole that can stand on
its own?
I do not think so. In the case of a poem or an essay or a book,
we ordinarily assume that there is a single guiding mind
controlling its creation.' 2 Pound sent the changed Wasteland
back to Eliot, not on to the printer. Sentences, forms of
expression, even ideas that are not originally the author's own
become his by adoption, because he actually, and I emphasize
actually, considers them, sentence by sentence, phrase by
phrase, thought by thought, comma by comma, and makes
them his own after deliberation. To the extent that he does not,
they mar the piece, and the process of reading, close reading,
will involve pruning them away, putting them aside, and not
hearing them. To be sure, there is legislation with its special
claim to our respect. But other pieces of writing-and perhaps
legislation too-exert their authority over us and command our
respect and serious attention because and to the extent that we
hear a person speaking through them. Their authority rests
upon the sense of mind behind them. The Ancient Mariner
the presuppositions of legal analysis as judicial practice moves toward the
administrative. And it is of interest that when there is reference to the
problem and to the losses that can be foreseen, terms such as
"disenchantment" are used to explain what is meant. See, e.g., Remarks of
Justice William H. Rehnquist, American Bar Association, Section of
Administrative Law, Bicentennial Institute, March 18, 1976, Transcript
98-106, reprinted in Bernard Schwartz, Administrative Law: A Casebook
(Boston: Little, Brown, 1977), 494-495; Paul D. Carrington, "The Dangers
of Judicial Delegation: Concluding Remarks" (1971), 52 F.R.D. 76, 78.
"Valerie Eliot, ed., The Waste Land: A Facsimile and Transcript of the
Original Drafts Including the Annotations of Ezra Pound (New York:
Harcourt Brace Jovanovich, 1971).
12The fact that one cannot ask an author for a spoken explanation of a
written text, or that an explanation of a written text might take the form of
slowly reading it through aloud, does not mean at all that there is no mind
behind it.
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exerted power over the wedding guest. He "held him with his
glittering eye." Writings do the same with us, if they hold us at
all.
What then are we to do in the United States if the Supreme
Court no longer looks at us with a glittering eye? How will legal
analysis be done if Supreme Court opinions come to resemble
the opinions of a large administrative agency? The question is a
real one, and an important one, at least in the United States,
and I think it is one that should now be pursued. The courts are
among the last of the great voices to be rationalized, detached
from substance and reduced to process, as a result of that
pursuit of objectivity outside ourselves which has produced
both the radical individualism and the impersonal bureaucracy
we know today. The bureaucratization of courts may not come
to pass. The reality of the possibility may jolt us all into more
attention to the underpinnings of law. There may in fact be a
choice to be made between the authoritative and the
authoritarian, and when we or those who come after us look
back, it may be clear that it is we who have made the choice. No
doubt we will move incrementally in institutional change, since
this is a basic matter, and what emerges will not be conceived
by any of us now alive. But growth in a particular direction is
not inevitable.
It is time to ask again why lawyers do what they do when
constructing an authoritative statement of law. We can begin
by looking anew at the connections and distinctions between
lawyers and the practitioners of other disciplines-all
disciplines, not just the social sciences to which we have
recently attended. It is time to ask whether there can be any
alternative to the method lawyers use. Only then will we and
our successors be in a position to consider, with a sense of what
is truly at stake, the design and redesign of the institutional
structure expressing and making possible what lawyers do when
they are asked to supply legitimacy to the world.
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